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The smuggling cost of an imported illegal good decreases as the volume of legally imported goods increases. First because 
more imports are typically associated to an increased number of transporters, which is an increased supply of potential 
smugglers. Second because, as the number of shipments increases, the individual inspection probability decreases, lowering 
the risk born by the smugglers and thus their compensation. I test this theory using data on the market for cocaine, finding 
empirical support: in a panel of countries, an increased volume of imports is robustly associated to a decreased price of 
cocaine. Legal and illegal trade appear to be complementary. 
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 “ [...] She Don’t Lie”
J.J.Cale, Cocaine (1976)
1 Introduction
The price of cocaine has decreased substantially over the past 15 years. In the US,
the World’s biggest destination market, the average price of a gram in 1990 was 184
dollars; 16 years later, the same gram fetched only 94 dollars. Adjusting these ﬁgures
for inﬂation results in a price decline of more than two thirds. The pattern is similar in
Western European countries, the second biggest cocaine market. In Spain, for instance,
the average retail price decreased from 110 dollars per gram in 1990 to 56 in 2002. In
Italy, it decreased from 160 dollars per gram in 1992 to 84 in 2002.
I show that part of this price decline is explained by a decreased cost to bring the
cocaine to market, which is itself a consequence of an increased volume of international
trade. The intuition behind the theory lies in the way an imported illegal good is smuggled
inside a country, typically hidden in the shipment of some other imported good.
Namely an increased inﬂow of imports is normally associated to a bigger number of
transporters at the entry ports, which implies a bigger supply of potential drug smugglers
and thus a reduced drug transportation cost. But the increased number of transporters
is also associated to a smaller individual inspection probability, simply because a careful
inspection of all freights becomes increasingly costly and diﬃcult as their number grows.
Thus, for a constant enforcing eﬀort of the authorities, the risk born by the drug smugglers
decreases as the volume of imports increases, driving down their equilibrium compensation
and so the smuggling cost. In addition, the lower inspection probability induces also more
transporters to become smugglers, further reducing the drug transportation cost.
I test this theory with a panel of data on the cocaine market in 15 OECD countries
from 1990 to 2006. The empirical test entails a regression of the price of cocaine on a
2measure of imported goods, controlling for transportation costs, for the enforcing eﬀorts
of the police and for the market power of the drug dealers. I ﬁnd that the import variable
is a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of the price of cocaine.
The main theoretical insight of the paper is that legal and illegal trade are comple-
mentary: it is not possible to open a country to international trade without providing
incentives to engage in illegal trade as an unintended consequence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a simple model that
clariﬁes the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the market for cocaine. Section 4
summarizes all the regression results. Section 5 discusses the identiﬁcation of the empirical
model, some alternative explanations of the cocaine price decline and an analysis of the
interaction between the cocaine market and the market for opiates. Section 6 concludes.
The appendix proposes a fully speciﬁed model and brieﬂy summarizes all the production
steps needed to transform coca leafs into cocaine.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section I propose a simple model that clariﬁes the conceptual framework behind
the estimation. The model makes explicit the source of the link between the level of legal
imports and the price of illegal drugs and therefore the complementarity between legal
and illegal trade. In appendix, I discuss a fully speciﬁed model that delivers the log linear
relationship between cocaine prices and inputs that I estimate.
The economy is populated by a representative consumer with utility deﬁned over an
illegal drug d and an imported composite good; by a set of transporters, whose job is
to bring the imported good inside the country; and by a drug dealer that dominates the
entire domestic market. The consumer’s demand for drug is a function f of income M and
of the drug price p. I assume that the illegal drug is produced abroad and then smuggled
inside the country, as it is the case of cocaine for Europe and the US. The drug dealer
buys smuggling services from the transporters, in exchange for a smuggling fee ps for each
3unit of drug. However not all transporters accept the job, since there is a probability π
that they will be inspected and sentenced to jail. The supply of drug smugglers is thus a
function of the potential number of smugglers, given by the actual number of transporters,
of the auditing probability π and of the fee ps. Since the number of transporters is a
direct function of the level of imported good I, the supply of transporters/smugglers can
be written as S = g(I,π,ps). I assume that the dealer supplies all the drug demanded
and simply charges a markup (1 + γ) over the sum of smuggling fee plus any physical
transportation cost τ, so that p = (1 + γ)(ps + τ). I also assume, for simplicity, that 1
smuggler is needed to transport 1 unit of drug. Then the demand for smugglers is given
by d = f(M,(1 + γ)(ps + τ)) and it is a decreasing function of the smuggling price. The
smuggling price is then determined as the equilibrium of the smuggling market:
f(M,(1 + γ)(ps + τ)) = g(I,π,ps)
Which is simply the intersection between a downward sloping demand and an upward
sloping supply. This equilibrium relationship, combined with the pricing rule, implies the
following expression that relates the drug price to imports, to income, to the inspection








Where the imports are an increasing function of income and a decreasing function
of transportation costs I = I(M,τ). The last part of the model entails the inspection
probability π. For a given level of eﬀort e of the anti-drug authorities, it decreases as
the number of transporters that cross the border increases, since a careful inspection of
all the freights becomes increasingly costly and diﬃcult (or simply impossible) as their
number increases. It follows that π is an decreasing function of the volume of imports
and an increasing function of enforcing, π = h(I,e).
A higher auditing probability translates in a lower number of smugglers and thus in
a contraction of the supply curve that will increase the drug price. An increased inﬂow
4of imports needs and increased number of transporters that will increase the number
of smugglers, decreasing the smuggling fee. For a given level of enforcing eﬀort, the
increased imports will also determine a decreased inspection probability, which will further
increase the supply of smugglers and decrease the drug price. The direct eﬀect of a
transportation cost increase is an increased ﬁnal price of the drug. However an increased
transportation cost will also induce a lower demand for imports, and therefore a smaller
supply of transporters that will further increase the drug price. An increased income will
increase the demand for imports and so the supply of transporters, indirectly reducing
the drug price. Nevertheless the ﬁnal eﬀect of income depends crucially on the income
elasticity of the drug demand. Given the addictive nature of the drug, it is reasonable
to predict an almost inelastic demand, mostly driven by a group of regular users, that
will result in a combined negative eﬀect. But a drug like cocaine is also an “upscale”
drug and it is not implausible to have a substitution away from other illegal drugs in
favor of cocaine as the income level increases, or simply an increased demand coming
from occasional richer users. An increased drug demand will be then associated to an
increased demand for smugglers, that will lead to a higher smuggling fee and a higher
drug price, with an uncertain combined eﬀect.
3 The Cocaine Market
There are two features of the cocaine market that make it ideal for testing the theory.
First, the coca bush, from which the leaves are harvested, grows only in Colombia, Peru’
and Bolivia1 and thus must be imported in all destination markets. Second, The United
Nations Oﬃce on Drug and Crime (UNODC) reports detailed data on production, seizures
and prices, for a relatively long time series and a good number of countries.
Figure (1) gives an idea of the supply side of the cocaine market. The estimate of
1There is also a small cocaine production in Ecuador, right across the border from Colombia, that
accounts for less than 1% of the total World production.
5potential production of cocaine powder (or cocaine HCI) is plotted alongside the esti-
mated cocaine availability, which is simply computed as the diﬀerence between the total
estimated production and the total amount of worldwide cocaine seizures. As the picture
shows, both production and availability are stable until 2002. After that, there is both
an increased production2 and an increase in seizures, that imply, overall, a signiﬁcative
lower potential cocaine availability3. Moreover, since emerging cocaine markets, such as
Australia and South Africa, are absorbing increasing drug quantities, the cocaine avail-
ability on the North American and European markets after 2002 should be even lower
that suggested by ﬁgure (1).
But the estimates of potential cocaine production are only a proxy for the total quan-
tity of cocaine that is brought to market by the drug cartels (excluding seizures). In other
words, it is perfectly plausible that the cocaine production capacity is not fully exploited,
which implies that a lower total cocaine potential production can be also associated to a
higher quantity of cocaine on the market (which is then subject to random seizures). This
is especially true if we think about drug cartels as monopolists that decide the quantity
sold on the basis of the elasticity of (wholesale) demand. This is also the reason why the
stable or decreased cocaine availability highlighted in ﬁgure (1) can be perfectly consistent
with an increased cocaine consumption.
The prices of dried coca leaf and of cocaine HCI in the producing countries remained
stable or mildly increasing. Figure (2) summarizes the available data from the UNODC.
The upper left panel refers to the price of dried coca leaf in the Chapare region of Bolivia,
which accounts for 1/3 of the total Bolivian production (10% of the total World production
in 2007). The price is substantially stable from 1990 to 1999. It then spikes up around 2000
as a consequence of a production shortage, partly determined by increased eradication
eﬀorts and partly by more repressing anti-drug laws. After a period of stable prices and
2In particular, the increased production is the result of an increased cultivation of the coca bush that
is partially oﬀset by decreased yields per hectare (World Drug Report 2008).
3Perhaps part of this increase in seizures can be explained by the tighter controls at the border that
followed the 9/11 attacks.
6production, the price decreased in 2005, following the uprising of the cocaleros lead by
Evo Morales. But, regardless of this last decline, the price, at the end of 2006, was still
three time as big as it used to be in 1990. The average national price of dried coca leaf in
Peru’ (28% of total world production in 2007) is shown in the upper right panel of ﬁgure
(2). After an highly volatile period between 1990 and 1996, it appears to be steadily
increasing, with a price that, in 2007, was about twice as big as it used to be in 1990.
Arguably the retail price of cocaine should not be very sensitive to the price of dried
coca leaf. The cocaine industry is, in fact, essentially a service industry, since the ﬁnal,
retail price of cocaine is between 200 and 250 times more than the price of the raw
materials (Reuter, MacCoun and Murphy (1990) and Miron (2003)). But the price of
ﬁnished cocaine did not decrease as well. The lower left panel of ﬁgure (2) shows, in
fact, a volatile, but stable, price for the cocaine HCI in Colombia, which accounts for
62% of the total world production in 2007. This evidence of a stable cocaine price is
also corroborated by a look at the price of legal cocaine in the US, which is the cocaine
manufactured by few licensed pharmaceutical companies for medical use4. As reported
by Basov, Jacobsen and Miron (2001), this price increased in the early 90’s, but remained
almost ﬂat until 2000.
Despite the constant or increased prices in the producing countries, the wholesale and
retail prices of cocaine, both in the US and in Europe, decreased substantially. Figure
(3) summarizes the price data relative to the 4 biggest cocaine markets: US, UK, Spain
and Italy. The retail price of cocaine in the US decreased from 184 dollars per gram
in 1990 to 94 dollars in 2006. In Spain, the price decreased from 100 dollars in 1990
to 52 in 2001, to then bounce back to 76 in 2006. In Italy, the price decreased from
164 dollars in 1992 to 90 dollars in 2002, to then go up again to 104 in 2006. In the
4Cocaine is used a topical anesthetic of the upper respiratory tract. In fact the anesthetic properties
of the coca leaf are well known by the Andean populations that use them to numb the stomach and quiet
the hunger. Legal cocaine is also used for scientiﬁc purposes and to develop eﬀective drug tests. See
Miron (2003) for further information.
7UK, the price declined steadily from 130 dollars in 1990 to 87 in 2006. Wholesale prices
followed a similar pattern. Overall, a careful look at all the available price data from
the UNODC, which include 12 more European countries, suggests that the bulk of the
price decrease, in almost all markets, took place between 1990 and 2001, exactly when the
cocaine availability on the World’s market was stable. After 2001, the increased worldwide
seizures, and the consequent scarcity of cocaine, determined an increase of most wholesale
and retail prices.
A joint analysis of the wholesale and retail prices reveals also the absence of a system-
atic decrease in the market power of drug dealers. This is in fact an unlikely event, since
drug markets are not typically characterized by free entry, but by few dominating cartels,
often at war with each other. The only notable change in the market structure observed
in the past decade has been a switch from Colombian to Mexican cartels, but without a
signiﬁcative impact on the market concentration. It is also unlikely that an increase in
the number of street pushers that could have decreased their compensation and so the
distribution costs of the cartels. The reason is that, as stressed by Levitt and Venkatesh
(2000), their salary is already very low and there is no further reduction margin that can
explain a signiﬁcant cost reduction.
To give a graphical idea of the retailers’ market power, ﬁgure (3) plots, in addition
to the prices, the cocaine markup, simply computed as the percentage diﬀerence between
the retail and the wholesale price. In the US, the markup decreased from 1990 to 1994
but, between 1994 and 2002, in a period of sharp decline of the retail price, it actually
increased. In fact the correlation between retail price and markup, over all the sample,
is negative (-0.15). Similarly, the correlation between retail price and markup, in Italy, is
very close to 0. Spain and UK, on the other hand, are characterized by a positive but small
value of the correlation (0.23 and 0.33, respectively). A closer look at the time series of
these two countries reveals the presence of many years characterized by a decreased retail
price and an increased markup (and viceversa). Looking at other European countries,
the evidence is mixed. While some of them show negative or mildly positive values of the
8correlation, Germany, France, Austria, Netherland and Belgium are characterized by a
positive and high value.
The cocaine demand appears to be stable in the US, but substantially expanding in
Europe. According to the he National Survey on Drug use and Health (NSDUH), the
percentage of the US population that reported use of cocaine ﬂuctuated between 0.5%
and 1%, without any systematic trend. A substantial stability of the North American
market emerges also from two other sources that report contrasting results. The ﬁrst
is the “Monitoring the Future” survey administered by the National Institute of Drug
Abuse (NIDA), which reports an increased cocaine use among high school students in
the US and Canada. If, in 1990, only 3% of US 12th graders reported cocaine use, in
2006 the percentage doubled to 6%. Also younger students, between 8th and 12th grade,
reported an increase from 2% to 3.5%. The second source is Quest Diagnostic, which
reports a steadily decreasing percentage of the US national workforce that tested positive
for cocaine, from a 0.9% of the population in 1997 to 0.58% in 2007.
Conversely, according to the UNODC, the cocaine consumption in Spain spiked from
0.9% of the population in 1994 to 3.7% in 2004. In Italy, the consumption rose from 0.6%
in 1996 to 2.1% in 2005, while in the UK from 0.3% in 1993 to 2.4% in 2006. In fact all
the European countries exhibit an increased consumption, with only few exceptions. This
increasing trend in consumption in Europe is also stressed by the European Monitoring
Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction in its latest annual report (2009) and conﬁrmed by
the experts responses to the Annual Questionnaires administered by the UNODC, which
identiﬁed European countries as the main contributors to the worldwide growth in cocaine
consumption. Unfortunately, all data sources do not report systematically the average
quantity of cocaine consumed or the breakdown of the consumers increase into occasional
users and addicts, so that it is diﬃcult to infer the total quantity of cocaine consumed.
The last piece of evidence on the cocaine market comes from the analysis of seizures
data. Essentially the US and the big European markets show a similar pattern: an
increased number of seizures cases and an increased quantity of cocaine seized, but a
9decreasing average quantity seized. Under the assumption of constant enforcing eﬀort by
the authorities, this pattern is consistent with an increased number of drug consumers
and/or drug dealers. Both of which highlight, in line with the consumption data, an
expansion of the cocaine market. However, even assuming an increased demand, the
data do not rule out the possibility of an increased enforcing eﬀort, which would also
exclude the possibility that the price decline was actually an eﬀect of decreased enforcing.
Another possible interpretation of the lower average quantity seized is that the typical
drug shipment intercepted at the border is lower. This implies, for a constant quantity of
cocaine smuggled, an increased number of drug transporters. Comparing the seizures data
with the trade data, it also appear that, in some countries (US, Germany, Switzerland),
the quantity of cocaine seized grew less than the growth of imports, with a resulting
decreasing quantity of cocaine seized per unit of imported good. But this last quantity is
increasing in some markets (Spain, UK, Netherlands) and constant in others.
An increasing enforcing is also conﬁrmed by the data on eradications and spraying5
of coca cultivations, which increased sharply over the years (World Drug Report (2008)).
In addition, as Basov, Jacobson and Miron (2001) point out, the budget of the Ameri-
can Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is arguably the best equipped and
ﬁnanced authority to ﬁght narco-traﬃckers, increased considerably over the past years,
as the number of drug arrests did. Minimum sentence laws, especially in the US, also
contributed to raise the risk faced by drug dealers.
In conclusion, the data suggest a movement down the demand curve of cocaine. I
claim that this pattern can be partly explained by a lower cost to bring the cocaine to
market.
5The practice to spray herbicidals from airplanes was recently abandoned for the high level of risk
for the indigenous populations, whose staple crops have often been contaminated. This left room to a
manual crop eradication.
104 Regression Results
I test the main implications of the theory on a panel of annual data (1990-2006) for the US
and 14 European countries6, which covers most of the worldwide cocaine market (World
Drug Report (2008)). The full speciﬁcation of the empirical relationship is the following:
pit = β0 + β1 Iit + β2 eit + β3 τit + β4 Mit + ηi + δt + εit
where the indexes i and t denote, respectively, the country and the time period, and
where ηi is a country ﬁxed eﬀect and δ the coeﬃcient on a time trend. The data on
the retail and wholesale prices of cocaine p are from the UNODC and they are adjusted
for inﬂation. I put more emphasis on retail prices because they are much more reliable
than wholesale ones, being collected by police oﬃcers that routinely buy drugs on the
streets7. The measure of imports I that I use in the regression is the ratio between the
value of imported goods and GDP as reported in the OECD statistical database. As
a crude proxy for the level of enforcing e, I use the amount of cocaine seized by each
country as reported by the UNODC. As a measure of transportation costs τ, I use the
relative diﬀerence between the c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) and f.o.b. (free on board,
or custom) values of imports from Feenstra, Romalis and Schott. Since these data are
available only up to 2001, I am forced to run the regressions that include transportation
costs on a restricted sample. The income M is simply proxied by the GDP from the OECD
statistical database. To avoid collinearity problems, whenever the GDP is included as a
dependent variable, I use the value of imports instead of the ratio of imports to GDP. All
6UK, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium,
Austria, Denmark and Norway.
7The retail level transactions refer to the typical street level transactions of 1 or two doses, or between
half a gram and one gram. However the wholesale level transactions refer to diﬀerent transaction sizes,
which are potentially associated to very diﬀerent markets. In fact the price at which a street dealer buys
from a city wholesaler is typically diﬀerent from the price at which the city wholesaler buys from national
distributors. In this respect, the classiﬁcation of the prices proposed by the UNODC is unsatisfactory,
which is another reason to put more emphasis on retail prices.
11variables are in logs.
Table (1) summarizes the regression results for the retail price of cocaine. The import
variable is always statistically signiﬁcant and enters always with a negative sign in all
the estimated equations. In the baseline model speciﬁcation, the elasticity of the eﬀect
is -1.03, regardless of the control for the enforcing eﬀort, that does not explain at all the
cocaine price.
One problem with the use of seizures data is the presence of big outliers, which are
the consequence of infrequent exceptional cocaine seizures. In fact purging the sample
from the 3 countries were the outliers problem is worse (Ireland, Greece and Austria)
results into a (10% level) signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of 0.06 on seizures and into a signiﬁcant,
but smaller, coeﬃcient on the import variable of -0.54. However, this last result is just
the byproduct of the smaller panel on which I run the regression, since, not controlling
for the seizures, the (signiﬁcant) coeﬃcient is equal to -0.65.
Taking into account income eﬀects does not signiﬁcantly alter the value of the elasticity
of the cocaine price to imports. This last result is interesting, since it is reasonable to
associate a higher income both to an increase in international trade (Feenstra (2004))
and, at the same time, to an increased demand for cocaine, traditionally identiﬁed as an
upscale or “Champagne-like” drug. However, controlling for transportation costs reduces
the coeﬃcient on imports to -0.63. The reason is that lower transportation costs are not
only associated to a lower price of cocaine, but also to a lower price of the other imported
goods, which, by increasing their equilibrium quantity, further reduces the cocaine price.
To account for the dependency of the retail price of cocaine on the market power of
the drug dealers and on their commercial strategies, I also included the cocaine markup
in the regression. Unfortunately, I have to exclude some observations as a consequence
of reporting errors in the wholesale prices dataset, ending up with an unbalanced panel.
The inclusion of the markup still delivers a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the
import variable, but of a lower magnitude, -0.68. However, the smaller magnitude is
entirely dependent upon the sample on which I run the regression. Since the markup
12is computed as the percentage diﬀerence between the retail and the wholesale price, it
is actually endogenous by construction. Nevertheless, the correlations between markups
and and retail prices are actually negative for 11 out of 15 countries. In practice, it looks
like retailers, in response to exogenous shocks that raise the wholesale prices, tend to
compress their proﬁt margin to avoid raising the retail prices too much. On the basis of
this evidence, it is possible to show that the estimator of the marginal eﬀect of imports is
upward biased, so that the interpretation of the main result is still valid. However, under
the same assumption, the estimator on the markup variable is actually positively biased
and, since I have a positive coeﬃcient, I will refrain from any interpretation.
To check for robustness, I implemented the regressions also with unadjusted retail
prices of cocaine, without any signiﬁcant change in he results. I also checked if the
regression results were somehow driven by the conversion of domestic cocaine prices in
dollars, by including the exchange rate in the regression equation. The cocaine wholesale
transactions are, in fact, typically carried out in dollars (at least until the recent Euro
overtake), but the retail transaction are not. Thus part of the behavior of the retail
price can be driven by movements of the exchange rate with respect to the dollar and,
since the exchange rate can also inﬂuence the size and composition of imports, there
is the possibility of spurious results in the regression. The result is that the coeﬃcient
on the exchange rate is very small and not statistically signiﬁcant. I also considered,
as dependent variable, the import penetration rate, which is the ratio between imports
and domestic demand (GDP-exports+imports), reaching very similar conclusions. Even
allowing for country speciﬁc time trends does not alter signiﬁcantly the results8. Including
the lagged cocaine price in the regression and estimating the resulting equation with an
Arellano-Bond type estimator, also delivered very similar results (details available upon
8The strategy to estimate such a model consists in ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the data to eliminate the country
ﬁxed eﬀects and then estimating the resulting equation using standard ﬁxed eﬀects (which are now the
country speciﬁc coeﬃcients on the time trend) techniques. Since all the data are in logs, the results from
this estimation procedure can also be interpreted as saying that a positive growth rate of the ratio of
imports to GDP predicts a negative growth rate of the price of cocaine.
13request).
The left panel of table (2) summarizes the empirical results for the wholesale price of
cocaine. Overall, the results are stronger in the full sample speciﬁcation (that excludes
the observations reported with errors), but weaker in the smaller samples. In particular,
in the benchmark speciﬁcation the coeﬃcient on the import variable is equal to -0.57
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level regardless of the control for enforcing. Controlling for
income eﬀects results into a slightly smaller coeﬃcient (-0.47). However, controlling for
transportation costs, results into an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, that is a consequence of the
smaller sample on which I am forced to run the regression.
Unfortunately, I cannot test directly the implication of my theory for the inspection
probability at the border. First because, even if I have data on the reported seizures at
the country level, I don’t have any information about the percentage of the seizures made
at the border versus the percentage made within the country’s territory. Second because
it is impossible to know the eﬀective quantity of drug that ﬂows through a particular
border, especially because many countries, like Spain and the Netherlands, are both hubs
for international trade and signiﬁcative ﬁnal consumers. For the very same reasons, even
the ratio between the total quantity of cocaine seized and the the total quantity produced
is not a clear proxy for the aggregate seizures probability. Also because the same cocaine
shipment can travel through diﬀerent borders before arriving to its ﬁnal destination and,
typically, does (World Drug Report 2008).
Nevertheless I can still check if my theory predicts a decreased level of enforcing when
the import to GDP ratio increases. The right panel of table (2) reports the results from
this empirical exercise. Again I excluded Ireland, Greece and Austria from the panel as
a consequence of the seizures outliers. In column (6), the dependent variable is the total
quantity of cocaine seized. In line with the theory, the coeﬃcient on imports is negative
(controlling for income eﬀects): the increased volume of imports is actually associated
to a decreased quantity of drug seized. Column (7) refers to the ratio of the quantity of
drug seized over the fraction of the total World production that can be associated to the
14domestic market, which can be considered as a crude proxy for the inspection probability9.
The result is indeed very similar.
The last test of the theory concerns its cross sectional implications. The ﬁrst im-
plication is that the countries that experienced a more pronounced increase in imports
must be also the ones that experienced a more sensible cocaine price decline. Given the
considerable number of countries included in the sample, I do not expect to ﬁnd exactly
the same ranking. But I should be able at least to observe a price reduction above the
median if the country experienced an import increase above the median. In fact the data
consistently show this pattern, with 6 out of 7 countries above the median import/gdp
increase in the sample (70% between 1990 and 2006) experiencing a retail price decrease
above the median (53%). Even dividing the sample into three homogeneous groups based
on the sample value of the import/gdp increases (with cutoﬀs 45% and 75%) results into
a good prediction of 1 out 3 countries in the ﬁrst group, 3 out of 6 in the second and 4
out of 5 in the third. The second, and stronger, cross sectional implication of the theory
is that the countries with a bigger ratio of imports to GDP should be, everything else
equal, the ones where it is easier to smuggle cocaine and, therefore, the ones with the
lowest cocaine price. Dividing the sample at the median, I ﬁnd again that 5 out of 7
countries with an import/gdp ratio below the median (30%) are the ones with a retail
cocaine price above the median (100 usd/gram). Dividing into homogeneous groups with
respect to the average imp/gdp ratio (with cutoﬀs 25% and 40%), I can predict 1 out of
9To compute the denominator of this probability, I simply assumed that, since 43% of cocaine users
are in North America and 25% in Western and Central Europe (World Drug Report (2008)), the exact
same fractions of the total world production can be associated to the US and to the European countries
(The two important assumptions underlying this computation are that the consumption of cocaine per
person is similar in all the countries in the sample and that the drug destined to Europe transits in all
the European countries in the sample). Then I used the same weights used by the UNODC to compute
a weighted average European price to assign the total European cocaine supply to the single countries.
Finally, according to the World Drug Report (2008), I considered Spain and the Netherlands as transit
countries, associating to them the entire European supply.
153 countries in the ﬁrst group, 4 out of 8 in the second and 2 out of 3 in the third, which,
unfortunately, it is not diﬀerent than what I would get by guessing.
5 Discussion and Identiﬁcation
5.1 Identiﬁcation: Distance and the Cost of Trade
One potential concern about the regression results is that, if the cost of doing trade
decreased between 1990 and 2006, then it is plausible to observe both a decreased price
of all the imported goods and an increased volume of imports. In other words, there is
the possibility that the regression results are spurious. Since I am already controlling for
transportation costs in the regressions, the main source of spuriousness entails reduced
communication costs and technological improvements that allow the counterparts of a
commercial agreement to better monitor the transactions.
To prove that my empirical model is indeed identiﬁed, I show that the distance between
two trading countries is as important as a predictor of the volume of trade in 2005 as it used
to be in 1990. This will exclude the possibility that easier communications determined the
increased volume of trade, since this would clearly imply a less important role of distance10.
Methodologically speaking, I rely on the estimation of gravity equations11, which relate the
bilateral trade ﬂows to the GDP of the trading partners and to their distance, controlling
for physical, legal or cultural barriers. The typical empirical relationship is the following:
tradeij = β0 + β1 gdpi + β2 gdpj + β3 distij + Θ
0Xij + εij
where Xij is a vector of control variables speciﬁc to the country pair i,j. I assembled
a dataset of bilateral trade ﬂows among the countries included in the main panel and
between them and the Central and Latin American countries that either produce cocaine
10See Krugman (1995) for a similar discussion.
11See Feenstra (2003) for a discussion of the theoretical foundations and of the empirical applications.
16or are typical transit points12, along with Nigeria, whose hub role has become increas-
ingly important for the European market (World Drug Report (2008)). I estimated cross
sectional gravity equations for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. As control variables, I included
two dummy variables that are equal to 1, respectively, if the countries have a border in
common or if the same language is spoken. The data on the bilateral trade ﬂows are from
the OECD, while the GDP data are from the World Bank Development Indicators. The
distance is from the CIA World Factbook. Table (3) summarizes the results.
As the regression results clearly show, the distance between countries is as important
in 2005 as it used to be in 1990 at predicting the ﬂow of trade. Even more persuasively,
the coeﬃcient in 2000 is actually higher than in 1990. The results do not change if the
insigniﬁcant border dummy is excluded from the regression, if transportation costs or
duties are explicitly added in the estimated equation or if country dummies are added
(details available upon request).
A further, and closely related, assessment of the identiﬁcation of the empirical model
comes again from the empirical gravity equation literature. In fact, since the size of the
trading partners, in terms of GDP, is consistently shown to be a good predictor of the
volume of trade between them, it is possible to conclude that an increased volume of
trade is just a consequence of expanding economies worldwide. Baier and Bergstrand
(2001) conﬁrm empirically this claim, by means of an empirical decomposition of the
determinants of the increased volume of trade in the post World War II era. Their main
result is that GDP growth explains 67% of the world trade growth, tariﬀs reductions 25%
and transportation costs only 8%.
To check if their conclusion is still valid in my sample, I implemented their very same
analysis with the multilateral trade ﬂows of the countries that have the biggest cocaine
12The sample includes Bolivia, Colombia, Peru` , Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Panama,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Belize, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Chile. Canada is excluded
from the sample since it is not so important as a transit country for the cocaine, but its inclusion in the
sample is inconsequential for the results.
17markets, ﬁnding very similar results (details available upon request). For instance, in
the US, the decline in duties accounts for 21% of the trade increase, while the declining
transportation costs for only 3%. The remaining 3 quarters of the increase is accounted
for by the growth of GDP. The results are even stronger for the value of imported goods,
as opposed to the total value of trade.
A further conclusion from this last analysis, which is especially true for the US econ-
omy, is that the progressive fall of the legal barriers explains the increase of trade more
than the fall of the physical barriers. A result in line with Krugman (1995), who argues
that “The great expansion of international trade after World War II is largely a result of
the removal of protectionist measures”. This is again assessing my identiﬁcation assump-
tion, providing an exogenous source of variation of the volume of imports that is safe to
consider as completely unrelated to the cocaine market.
One last argument in favor of the identiﬁcation of my empirical model comes from the
work by Helpman (1987). Namely an additional determinant of the trade growth is the
increased income of developing countries or, in general, the income convergence across
trading partners, given that the trade between countries of disproportionately diﬀerent
sizes is necessary smaller than the trade between more equal partners13.
5.2 Alternative Explanations of the Cocaine Price Decline
One possible explanation of the cocaine price decline entails a deliberate policy of the drug
dealers: facing a higher demand elasticity, they could have reduced the price to increase
the quantity sold and, therefore, their proﬁts. In fact a sudden popularity of cocaine could
have determined an increase of occasional users, for which the price elasticity of demand
is higher. But the available estimates of the short run price elasticity of cocaine demand
(Grossman and Chaloupka (1998) and DiNardo (1993)) already indicate very low values,
most likely because a great portion of demand is accounted for by addicts. It is also
13See Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) for more extensive empirical
tests of the theory.
18unlikely that the dealers decided to reduce the price to increase not only consumption
but also the addiction rates, to maximize the long run proﬁts. In fact, the uncertainty
associated to their position of monopolists makes them more prone to reap immediately
the beneﬁts: after all, a turf war can rapidly subvert the order and they can die soon.
Even if the elasticity did not change, it is still possible that the dealers decreased
the price to stimulate the market for occasional consumers and, to avoid compressing
their proﬁt margin, that they decided to do so by decreasing the purity of the drug.
Unfortunately, the UNODC does not report systematic information about the purity
level for the entire panel and the few data available for Spain, the UK and the US,
are not enough to corroborate or reject this alternative theory. In fact, in the US, the
typical purity level in 1999 was 55% and the typical price 118 dollars per gram, while in
2003 the market price for a 70% pure gram was just 75 dollars. In the following years
(until 2006), the purity remained around 70%, and the price increased up to 96 dollars.
Nevertheless, the price never reached the level paid 7 years before for a 30% less pure
gram (not adjusting for inﬂation). At the wholesale level, the typical purity was 63% in
1999 and 68% in 2003, but the price declined from 30.8 dollars per gram to 21.5. A similar
unclear pattern is observed in Spain at a retail level, where the typical purity level went
up from 46% in 1997 to 50% in 2001 and 53% in 2006, but the price decreased from 68
dollars per gram in 1997 to 52 in 2001, to then go up to 76 in 2006. The UK, conversely,
shows a consistently decreasing purity, from 61% in 1999 to 51% in 2003 and 42% in 2004,
but the price fell from 104 dollars per gram in 1999 to 90 in 2003 and stayed constant
regardless of the decreased purity.
5.3 The Market for Opiates
Another possible explanation of the price decline is a competitive pressure coming from a
decreased price of other drugs. To some extents, diﬀerent drugs, having diﬀerent eﬀects,
cannot really be considered as substitutes. Think about cocaine and heroin, for instance:
while the ﬁrst one is associated to euphoria, the second has mostly a narcotic eﬀect. Also,
19once an habit is developed, the possibility of drug substitution is actually zero and a
big chunk of the drug demand comes from addicts. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to
assume that, for some occasional drug user, the choice of the drug comes also from a
price comparison. Which actually means that, to win the market for occasional users, the
cocaine prices must be sensitive to other drug prices. But it is also true that the prices
of other imported drugs can behave exactly as the cocaine prices, simply because also
the price to bring them to market decreased. To shed light on these issues, I propose in
this section an analysis of the market for opiates drugs, heroin and morphine, since this
is only one for which the UNODC reports detailed price data.
All opiates drug are derived from a resin extracted from the seed capsule of the “Pa-
paverum Sonniferum” poppy. Opium poppies are mainly produced, for drug extraction
purposes, in Afghanistan (80% of total World supply), Myanmar (12%) and marginally
in Cambodia, Laos and Colombia. Like cocaine, opiates must therefore be imported in
all the Western European and North American destination markets. However, unlike co-
caine, the biggest consumption markets, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan (that account for
60% of the worldwide consumption) are now excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, the
worldwide demand of these drugs appears to be stable or decreasing. In addition, the com-
position of the total world supply of opium poppies experienced signiﬁcant changes, some
of which are determined by the Taliban’s regime attitude towards opium in Afghanistan.
Also most of the worldwide opiates seizures are typically made closer to the production
points or in Iran.
The price of opiates decreased signiﬁcantly in the US and in western Europe. While
a gram of heroin was sold, at the retail level, for 280 dollars in the US in 1990, the same
gram was worth only about 170 dollars in 2006, with a peak low around 100 dollars in
2002. Similarly, in the UK, the largest market among all OECD countries, the price of
a gram of heroin decreased from 150 dollars in 1990 to 70 dollars in 2006. All the other
countries for which the UNODC reports data experienced a similar pattern.
Since the opiates price behave similarly to cocaine prices, I checked if, according to
20the theory, part of their decline is explained by increased imports. The ﬁrst empirical
result is that the theory is indeed conﬁrmed. The ﬁrst column of table (4) summarizes
the results of a regression of the retail price of opiates on the ratio of imports to GDP14.
Once again, an increase in imports is signiﬁcantly associated to a decreased drug price,
with an elasticity of -0.5.
To check if part of the cocaine price decline can be explained by the competitive
pressure coming from heroin and morphine, I included the price of opiates in the regression
of the retail price of cocaine on imports. The problem is that, since both prices are
determined simultaneously, perhaps, at the retail level, by the very same dealers, it is not
possible to estimate consistently the coeﬃcient of interest. However, I can use the theory
to identify exogenous instruments. The simple idea is to use the variability of a very
narrow category of imports (from the OECD database) which, being very small relative
to the total mass of imported goods, is unlikely to have a strong impact on the cocaine
price but, being a major component of the exports of an opium producing country, is
likely to have an eﬀect on opiates prices. Afghanistan is the World’s biggest producer and
exporter of opium poppies, but it also exports wool, cotton, carpets and animal skins.
It turns out that, in the panel, the imports of these goods (relative to GDP) are not
signiﬁcantly associated to the price of cocaine but they have explanatory power for the
price of opiates. To avoid an indirect eﬀect on the cocaine price working through to
the total amount of imports, I purged the total amount of imports from the goods used
as instruments (which account, on average, just for 0.5% of the total). As column 5 of
table (4) shows, the coeﬃcient on the opiates prices is positive, meaning that part the
decreased price of cocaine can be in fact explained by a decreased price of opiates. But,
regardless of this eﬀect, the import variable still retains its explanatory power on the price
of cocaine and the coeﬃcient is very similar to the one obtained in the regression that
does not control for opiates prices (column 4). Using a similar empirical strategy, I also
14I excluded from the sample the ﬁrst 3 observations for Norway, as a consequence of data reporting
errors.
21included the price of cocaine in the regression of opiates prices. As instruments, I used
the imports of fresh fruit and coﬀee, both of which are exported by the World’s biggest
cocaine producer, Colombia, but have no explanatory power for the opiates prices. As
column 3 of table (4) shows, the coeﬃcient on imports, controlling for the price of cocaine,
is now insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus the negative eﬀect of imports on the price
of opiates seems to be an eﬀect of the decreased price of cocaine.
6 Conclusion
Legal and illegal trade are complementary. Smuggling an illegal good inside a country
becomes easier and less costly as the volume of imported good increases. Both because
the supply of potential smugglers increases and because the risk of being caught decreases.
I showed that this mechanism is a plausible, but sure not complete, explanation of the
decreased price of cocaine (and opiates).
However I was unable to provide a comprehensive test of the theory. Cocaine is just
one of the imported illegal goods currently available on the black market. It is perhaps a
landmark example of a valuable smuggled goods, but certainly not the only one for which
the theory should have empirical bite. In fact not only illicit drugs, but also counterfeited
goods, like handbags, shoes or apparel, illegal chemical products, exotic animals etc,
should be experiencing a similar eﬀect of international trade.
Perhaps one of the most interesting applications of the theory entails illegal immigra-
tion. Namely, if it is easier to hide drugs, or other illegal goods, then it must be also
easier to hide people. For instance, it must be easier or cheaper to ﬁnd a truck driver
willing to hide an illegal immigrant while crossing the Mexico-US border at Laredo (TX)
during peak hours, simply because, especially after the NAFTA agreement, the number of
such trucks increased dramatically. But also because a careful inspection of all the trucks,
not only will be very costly, but will also signiﬁcantly slow down the queues and impede
trade, going against the motivations that led the countries to sign the trade agreement in
22the ﬁrst place (Naim(2005), Glenny (2008)).
A limitation of the analysis is that hiding the drug into a shipment of an imported
good is not the only possible way to smuggle the illegal drugs. In fact the drug dealers can
also hire individual runners or “Mules”, which are simply people that cross the border
with the drug hidden in their cars, clothes, luggage, or even swallowed. The problem
is that, since they enter the country at diﬀerent entry ports than the transporters of
imported goods, like airports, they face a diﬀerent inspection protocol. Thus it is the
increase in the volume of passengers rather than the increase in the volume of trade that




Suppose that the world is composed by J countries, each with a domestic market for
cocaine. Suppose also that there is a drug producing country and, within this country,
a drug cartel that dominates the entire wholesale World market. The cartel decides
the quantity of drug to ship to each country Dj in order to maximize its proﬁt, taking
into account that the cocaine wholesale price pw
j will depend upon the domestic cocaine
demand. To bring the drug illegally in the destination countries, the cartel needs the
services of drug smugglers, that charge a fee ps
j on each unit of drug shipped to country
j. But, since the drug is illegal, there is a probability πj that it will be intercepted by
the police and that it will not reach the country. I assume that the cartel maintains the
possession of the drug even if the smuggler is physically carrying it, so that it bears the














23where τj is an iceberg transportation cost that summarizes all the costs that are
necessary to physically bring the drug into country j except for the compensation of
the smugglers. To keep things simple, I assume that the producer countries have enough
production capability to service the entire world cocaine market under every condition or,
in other words, that the total cocaine production D =
P
j Dj is less than what is feasible
to produce. I also assume that the quantity of drug sold in the market is a function of




where ηj and εj are the elasticities with respect to income and price. I assume that,
once the drug is smuggled in the country, it is sold through retail drug dealers, that simply
charge a markup 1+γj on the wholesale price. So that the resulting retail price of cocaine
is
pj = (1 + γj)p
w
j (2)












The compensation of the cocaine smugglers in each country ps
j is determined as the
equilibrium of a competitive market. The supply side of this market is composed by the
runners and by the transporters of all the goods imported in country j. If they are not
inspected at the border, with probability 1 − πj, they earn the compensation ps
j. If they
are inspected, I just assume that they are charged with a pecuniary ﬁne f, which can also
monetized the disutility of being sentenced to prison. To control for the fact that some
individuals have strong moral issues against drugs, I assume that the potential smugglers
diﬀer in their perceived disutility attached to the ﬁne according to a parameter θ. I further




, with ˆ θ high enough so that
it can encompass honest people that will never accept to carry drugs. An individual will
become a smuggler if the expected utility of doing do is positive, or if
(1 − πj)p
s
j − πjθf ≥ 0
The above expression implies that all the individuals with disutility θ below a cut-oﬀ
value will become smugglers and all the others will not. Suppose that the total number of
transporters in country j is proportional to the aggregate domestic demand for imports
Ij and that the potential runners are in ﬁxed supply λj. Then, multiplying the fraction
of individuals that become smugglers by the total number of transporters and runners, I










where k is the elasticity of the number of transporters with respect to the demand
for imports. The demand side of the smuggling market is simply proportional to the
domestic demand for drug Dj according to the elasticity parameter α. Equating the
supply and demand of smugglers, I can solve for the equilibrium price of the smuggling












I also assume that the probability of inspection at the border is simply the ratio
between the number of inspection and the total volume of imported goods. But the
number of inspections is itself an increasing function of the enforcing eﬀort of the anti-
drug authorities e and, in particular, a concave function. In fact the number of inspections








with ξ < 1. Plugging (4) into (3), combining the resulting expression with the pricing
rule (2) and solving for the ﬁnal price of cocaine pj, I obtain a simple log linear expression15
that can be brought to the data:
log(pj) = β0 + β1 log(Ij) + β2 log(γj) + β3 log(ej) + β4 log(τj) + β5 log(Mj) (5)
where the β’s are all function of the structural model parameters.
The interesting feature of the model is that it delivers an inspection probability which
is a decreasing function of imports even if the eﬀort is optimally chosen by the anti-drug
authorities. Suppose that the authorities want to minimize the quantity of drug that
ﬂows into the country, but that the necessary eﬀort is costly. Suppose also that they have
the following linear loss function:
min
ej
δj[(1 − πj)Dj] + (1 − δj)ej
where πj is given by (4) and where δj is the weight assigned to the drug ﬂow. Taking the
ﬁrst order condition, solving for the optimal eﬀort and plugging the resulting expression















Even if the optimal eﬀort is an increasing function of the level of imports, the inspection
probability at the border is still a decreasing function of imports.
15Note that, if λ is small relative to Ik, then: log(Ik + λ) = log(λ(I
k
λ + 1)) = log(λ) + log((I
k
λ + 1)) ≈
log(λ) + log(I
k
λ ) = log(λI
k
λ ) = log(Ik)
26Cocaine Production Stages
The following techincal information is a summary of a DEA strategic intelligence report
published in September 1993.
Coca processing can be broken down into three stages. The ﬁrst is the conversion of
the coca leaf into coca paste, which is almost always done very close to the coca ﬁelds to
cut down on the transport cost of the coca leaves. The second is the conversion of the
coca paste into cocaine base. The ﬁnal stage is conversion of cocaine base into cocaine
HCI (Hydrocloride).
The conversion of coca leaf into coca paste is accomplished in a coca paste pit (pozo),
which is usually a hole in the ground, lined with thick, heavy plastic. After putting the
coca leaves in the pit, an alkaline material (sodium carbonate) and water are added to
the leaves to extract the cocaine alkaloid present in the leaf. Kerosene is then added to
water, solution, and leaves and the mixture agitated, usually by having several people
stomp on the leaves. Cocaine alkaloids and kerosene separate from water and leaves. The
water and leaves are then drained oﬀ. Cocaine alkaloids are extracted from the kerosene
into a dilute acid solution. Sodium carbonate is added to the remaining solution, which
causes a precipitate to form. The acid and the water are drained oﬀ and the precipitate
is ﬁltered and dried to produce coca paste. The process usually takes a few days.
The processing of coca paste into cocaine base is more complicated than paste pro-
duction, requiring more sophisticated equipment and skills. The coca paste is added to
sulfuric acid or hydrochloric acid and water. The paste is dissolved into the acid solution.
Potassium permanganate is combined with water. This mixture is added to the coca
paste and acid solution. Potassium permanganate is used in this step to extract other
alkaloids and material that is undesired in the ﬁnal product. This mixture is then allowed
to stand for about six hours. The solution is ﬁltered and the precipitate is discarded.
Ammonia water is added to the ﬁltered solution and another precipitate is formed. The
liquid is drained from the solution and the remaining precipitate is usually dried with
heating lamps. The resulting powder is cocaine base.
27The ﬁnal stage of cocaine processing requires even more skill and equipment, and is
much more dangerous than the previously mentioned steps. Unlike paste and base pro-
cessing, cocaine HCI processing needs expensive chemicals that are hard to ﬁnd and often
not manufactured in the processing country. Acetone or ether is added to dissolve the
cocaine base and the solution is ﬁltered to remove undesired material. Hydrochloric acid
diluted in acetone or ether is added to the cocaine solution. The addition of the hydrochlo-
ric acid causes the cocaine to crystallize out of the solution as cocaine hydrochloride. The
remaining acetone/ether solvent can be discarded or reused. Cocaine HCI is dried under
heat lamps, laid out to dry with the aid of fans, or dried in microwave ovens. It is common
in Colombia to skip the base stage of cocaine processing and go right from coca paste to
cocaine HCI, which is usually accomplished by avoiding adding potassium permanganate
solution.
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29Table 1: Explaining the Retail Price of Cocaine
Retail Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
imp/gdp -1.028* -1.037* -0.651** -0.633** -0.979* -0.658*











R2 0.395 0.411 0.364 0.464 0.543 0.426 0.343
obs 255 255 255 233 233 180 180
Notes: Dependent variable is the retail price of cocaine adjusted for inﬂation from the UNODC. markup is a proxy for
the markup applied by drug retailers, computed as the diﬀerence between wholesale and retail prices over wholesale prices.
imports/gdp is the ratio of imports to GDP from the OECD statistical database. transp is the transportation cost measured
as a ratio between the diﬀerence between the c.i.f. and f.ob. valued imports over the f.o.b valued imports from Feenstra,
Romalis and Schott database. seizures is the eﬀort of anti-drug enforcing authorities, proxied by the total amount of cocaine
seized, as reported by the UNODC. All variables are in logs. The panel Includes observations for US, Spain, UK, Italy,
France, Germany, Portugal, Ireland, Switzerland, Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Denmark and Norway from 1990
to 2006 (2001 if the transportation cost is included). If markups are used, the data are purged from all the observations
for Ireland, the ﬁrst 4 observations for Norway and the ﬁrst observation of France, as a consequence of reporting errors in
the wholesale price series. Estimation is performed with a panel ols estimator with ﬁxed country eﬀects and a time trend.
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in brackets. **=signiﬁcant at 1% level *=signiﬁcant at 5% level.
30Table 2: Explaining the Wholesale Price and the Seizures of Cocaine
Wholesale Price Seizures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) tot rel
imp/gdp -0.575** -0.488** -0.100 -0.103
(0.143) (0.142) (0.194) (0.197)








R2 0.219 0.111 0.010 0.335 0.348 0.188 0.020
obs 233 233 233 163 163 204 204
Notes: Dependent variable in columns 1-5 the wholesale price of cocaine adjusted for inﬂation from the UNODC. In
column 6 (tot) the total amount of cocaine seized in the country from the UNODC. In column 7 (rel), the total quantity of
cocaine seized over the fraction of the total world production that can be associated to the domestic market. imports/gdp
is the ratio of imports to GDP from the OECD statistical database. transp is the transportation cost measured as a ratio
between the diﬀerence between the c.i.f. and f.ob. valued imports over the f.o.b valued imports from Feenstra, Romalis
and Schott database. seizures is the eﬀort of anti-drug enforcing authorities, proxied by the total amount of cocaine seized,
as reported by the UNODC. All variables are in logs. The panel Includes observations for US, Spain, UK, Italy, France,
Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Denmark and Norway from 1990 to 2006 (2001 if
the transportation cost is included). In column 1-5, the data exclude the the ﬁrst 4 observations for Norway and the ﬁrst
observation of France, as a consequence of reporting errors in the wholesale price series. Austria and Greece are excluded
from the regressions in column 8 and 9. Estimation is performed with a panel ols estimator with ﬁxed country eﬀects and
a time trend. Standard errors clustered at the country level are in brackets. **=signiﬁcant at 1% level *=signiﬁcant at 5%
level ◦=signiﬁcant at the 10% level..
31Table 3: Gravity Equations, Bilateral Trade Flows
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
distance -0.909** -0.872** -0.953** -0.871** -0.892** -0.865** -0.943** -0.842**
(0.038) (0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.045) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043)
gdp imp 0.925** 0.917** 0.945** 0.976** 0.924** 0.917** 0.945** 0.975**
(0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
gdp exp 0.921** 0.974** 1.016** 1.015** 0.919** 0.979** 1.015** 1.014**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
border 0.158 0.072 0.088 0.243
(0.163) (0.158) (0.157) (0.155)
language 0.610** 0.625** 0.543** 0.499** 0.575** 0.609** 0.524** 0.445**
(0.141) (0.120) (0.122) (0.141) (0.139) (0.118) (0.121) (0.146)
R2 0.842 0.864 0.876 0.858 0.842 0.864 0.877 0.858
obs 580 643 660 651 580 643 660 651
Notes: Dependent variable is the bilateral trade ﬂows among France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Norway, Switzerland
the US and the U.K. and between these countries and Bolivia, Colombia, Peru` , Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Panama, Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Belize,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala and Nigeria. All the trade data are from the OECD. gdp imp is the GDP of the importer country while gdp exp the one
of the exporter, from the World Bank. The Distance between trading partners dist is from the CIA World Factbook. Border is a dummy variable that equals one if
the trading partners share a border. Language is equal to 1 if the same language is spoken in the trading countries. All variables are in logs. Standard Errors robust
to eteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. **=signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
3
2Table 4: Explaining the Retail Price of Opiates and Cocaine
Opiates Price Cocaine Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
imp/gdp -0.509*
(0.229)
imp/gdp (no cocaine instr) -0.596* 0.192
(0.227) (0.335)






R2 0.339 0.317 0.483 0.391 0.537
obs 252 244 244 244 244
Notes: Dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the retail price of opiates drug (heroin and morphine) adjusted for inﬂation
(opiates price) and in columns 4 and 5 the retail price of cocaine adjusted for inﬂation (cocaine price), both from the
UNODC. The same variables are also used as regressors in columns 3 and 5. The cocaine price in column 3 is instrumented
with the ratio of imports of fruit and coﬀee to GDP from the OECD statistical database. The opiates price in column 5 is
instrumented with the ratio of imports of carpets, wool, cotton and fur skins to GDP from the OECD statistical database.
imp/gdp is the ratio of imports to GDP from the OECD statistical database. imp/gdp (no coc instr) is the ratio of total
imports minus the imports used as instruments for the cocaine price over GDP. imp/gdp (no opium instr) is the ratio of
total imports minus the imports used as instruments for the opiates price over GDP. All variables are in logs. The panel
Includes observations for US, Spain, UK, Italy, France, Germany, Portugal, Ireland, Switzerland, Greece, Netherlands,
Belgium, Austria and Denmark from 1990 to 2006 and for Norway from 1993 to 2006. No disaggregated imports data are
available for Austria prior to 1995 and for Belgium prior to 1993, Estimation is performed with a panel IV estimator with
ﬁxed country eﬀects and a time trend. Standard errors are in brackets. **=signiﬁcant at 1% level *=signiﬁcant at 5% level.
























production production net of seizures
Notes: Production of cocaine powder (HCI) measured in tons. Production is the estimated production from the United
Nations Oﬃce on Drug and Crime(UNODC). Production net of seizures is the diﬀerence between total production and total
World seizures from the UNODC.
Figure 2: Price of Dried Coca Leaf and Cocaine HCI






































Notes: Upper left panel: monthly price (91-06) of dried coca leaf in the Chapare region of Bolivia in US dollars per kilo.
Upper right panel: monthly price (90-06) of dried coca leaf in Peru’ in US dollars per kilo. Lower left panel: yearly price
(91-06) of Cocaine HCI in Colombian US dollars per kilo. All the data are from the Andean Reports and the World Drug
Reports from the UNODC.
34Figure 3: Wholesale and Retail Price of Cocaine































































































































Notes: Wholesale and Retail price, in US dollars, of a gram of cocaine powder from the United Nations Oﬃce on Drug
and Crime (UNODC). Markup is the percentage diﬀerence between retail and wholesale price.
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